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The BRICS Summit process was inaugurated in 2009 as a signal that the global 
governance system of the future would need to be constituted to reflect a 
politically diverse, multipolar world. At this same moment, the crisis-driven 
creation of the G20 Leaders forum put the evolution of such a new global 
governance system on fast forward. As the G20 and BRICS Summits of 2016 
approach, understanding the role and influence of the rising powers and the 
related structures and associations which have been formed and promoted 
will be key to mapping and accelerating future global development and 
cooperation progress.
 Understanding the BRICS 
 Evolving Influence and 
 Role in Global Governance 
 and Development 
An evolving political-economic 
association
While the BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa) economic 
story has shifted dramatically since 
2009 and there is today a new global 
context of geopolitical, economic 
and financial uncertainties, the BRICS 
as a political-economic association 
continues to move forward. Most 
concretely, there is the institutionalised 
financial capacity in the form of the 
BRICS New Development Bank 
(NDB) and the Contingent Reserve 
Arrangement (CRA). Less noticed but 
more fundamental, is the ongoing 
programme of policy consultations 
and cooperative endeavours across a 
wide range of public policy issues. A 
BRICS Strategy agreed at the BRICS 
Summit in Ufa hosted by Russia in July 
2015 sets out the purpose and scope 
of the BRICS economic partnership. 
A jointly produced publicly accessible 
BRICS website is being set up and 
the possibility that it might become a 
virtual secretariat is under study. The 
8th BRICS Summit will be held in Goa, 
India, in October 2016, following on 
from the G20 Summit in September, 
hosted by China in Hangzhou. 
The G20 and the BRICS are symbiotic 
processes operating in an informal space 
outside of the post-Second World 
War global governance framework. 
The BRICS strongly support the G20 
and its self-proclaimed role as the 
world’s premier economic governance 
forum. They are also active supporters 
of the major UN-led Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) and climate 
change agreements of 2015. Apart 
from Russia, whose almost complete 
application process to join the OECD 
was suspended following the 2014 
events in Ukraine and Crimea, they are 
‘Key Partners’ of the OECD, involved in 
high-level meetings and a wide range of 
policy cooperation and are full members 
of the OECD Development Centre. 
Hence the BRICS as a political-economic 
association can be seen as nested within 
evolving international processes for 
treating the global governance and 
shared public policy issues of the highly 
interdependent multipolar world of the 
twenty-first century.
How the BRICS are challenging a 
US-led world order
At the same time, a fundamental systemic 
objective of the BRICS Summits has been the 
reform of voting power in the Bretton Woods 
institutions. The BRICS have indeed operated a 
‘challenge function’ in the international arena. 
With the implementation of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) reforms following the 
passage of authorising legislation by the US 
Congress in December 2015, the long delayed 
process of adjusting these voting powers to reflect 
new relative weights in the global economy has 
now begun. Significantly, the US Secretary to 
the Treasury felt it necessary to affirm that the 
reforms ‘reinforce the central role of the US in 
the global economic system and demonstrate our 
commitment to maintaining that position’.
The very existence of the BRICS presents an 
implicit challenge to the US-led world order 
but without direct confrontation.This strategic 
and tactical ambivalence is evident in successive 
Russian concept notes on the BRICS. The 
formation of the BRICS Summits was in fact a 
Russian initiative. It was launched in New York 
in 2006 at a lunch meeting of the RIC (Russia, 
India, China) club of foreign ministers, to which 
Brazil had been invited. South Africa joined 
at the third BRICS Summit meeting in Sanya, 
China, in 2011. Although the annual BRICS 
Summit Declarations have a strong geopolitical 
content, with assessments of current crises 
and faultlines around the world, the BRICS 
Summits are not a major forum for arriving at 
common positions or mutual support on these 
frontiers. The diplomacy on these questions is 
conducted by the individual BRICS countries in 
the context of other arenas and relationships. 
BRICS influence on multilateral 
development finance 
The active common endeavour of the BRICS 
is the New Development Bank (NDB), which 
has been designed as a shared enterprise 
to finance major infrastructure investments 
in the BRICS themselves and in Africa. The 
NDB can be expected to be a conduit for 
BRICS influence on development – the BRICS 
are largely absent from the financing of the 
established multilateral development banks, 
UN agencies and the various problem-focused 
funds that have been inspired by developed 
countries. While setting out to be different 
and innovative, reputational factors will bear 
on policies and operations. The initial NDB 
projects focus on renewable energy.
The Shanghai-based NDB and the Beijing-
based, China-led Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) have already exerted 
competitive pressures on the established 
institutions, even if unacknowledged. The 
Chinese official record of the Xi-Obama 
Summit of September 2015 provides an 
account of an agreement that US action on 
the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions 
would be accompanied by a readiness on 
China’s part to (a) ensure that new multilateral 
financing vehicles it promotes, currently and in 
the future, would embody the professionalism 
and standards of existing multilaterals, and 
(b) participate meaningfully in the funding of 
the established multilaterals. 
Hence the impetus generated by the 
initiatives from ‘outside’ the system is setting 
in motion a convergence dynamic within 
the enlarged multilateral development 
financing system, with push and pull 
forces and reputational incentives that will 
hopefully work to raise performance on all 
sides. Within such a dynamic, China, India 
and Brazil will bring their development 
experiences and lessons of the last 30 years, 
with ambitions, concepts, vocabularies and 
heterodox policies that lie ouside of the 
boundaries of the conventional recipies for 
‘normal’ convergent growth and poverty 
reduction. The AIIB has announced an initial 
set of projects to be co-financed with the 
Asian Development Bank, the World Bank 
and the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, which are in line with 
China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Silk 
Roads initiative, a coordinated strategy of 
extensive multilateral and bilateral cooperation 
and diplomacy, extending from the 
development sphere to security, the digital 
economy, media and culture.
The new shape of global governance 
in a multipolar world
The BRICS process includes an extensive 
programme of mutual learning activities, 
via ministerial and expert bodies that meet 
to exchange experience and sometimes to 
work on joint projects of cooperation with 
a framework now provided by the BRICS 
Strategy agreed at the Ufa Summit in 2015. 
The BRICS Strategy positions the BRICS 
as a platform ‘to promote peace, security, 
prosperity and development in a multipolar, 
interconnected and globalised world’. At this 
level, the issues and language of the BRICS 
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programme are not confrontational, indeed 
there is strong advocacy for a cooperative 
international system and the agenda echoes 
in large part the issues on the current agenda 
of the G20, the UN and the OECD. The 
multipolar nature of that international system 
is what the BRICS are working to emphasise 
and that is what constitutes the geopolitical 
significance of the BRICS as a political-
economic association. 
India’s Prime Minister Modi has underlined 
the logic and lasting capacity of the BRICS 
in this sense and announced that under 
the Indian Chair the theme for the BRICS 
Summit in Goa will be Building Responsive, 
Inclusive and Collective Solutions (BRICS) 
prepared via the ongoing programme of 
policy consultations and cooperation and 
academic forum and cultural, sporting and 
youth events. It echoes the UN 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development with its universal 
character. Meanwhile, President Xi Jinping has 
announced the theme of the G20 Hangzhou 
Summit as Towards an Innovative, Invigorated, 
Interconnected and Inclusive World Economy, 
which also reflects the current agendas in 
other international processes. In 2017, China 
will take on the leadership of the BRICS. 
A new shape of global governance, in which 
the G20 and the BRICS processes operate 
in an informal space, at Heads of State level, 
using similar modalities of a rotating chair, a 
large programme of sectoral and thematic 
work, and a public website is emerging and 
through which the BRICS are establishing 
their influence and legitimacy. This is set 
against a larger geopolitical canvas of current 
conflicts, frictions and encounters, as seen in 
the Ukraine, Syria and the South China Sea 
and larger shifts in the global economic and 
demographic landscape. 
South-South Cooperation and new 
approaches to international 
development 
The South-South frame of reference holds 
continuing power for the involvement of 
China, India, Brazil and South Africa in the 
development cooperation field (history and 
current politics exclude Russia from the 
South-South framework). Emerging from 
the Bandung conference in 1955, the South-
South narrative is based on ‘mutual benefit’ 
and is not concerned with wealth transfers 
but with the exchange of experience and 
knowledge. This stands in marked contrast 
with the OECD-DAC frame, in which aid is 
a welfare transfer evidenced in budgetary 
costs. Internationally, this latter construct and 
its associated obligations and measurement 
remain basic political reference points with 
historical and current resonance. Thus the 
North-South paradigm has not lost its 
significance even as economic categories 
have become much less clearcut. China has 
established two new South-South funds 
and new academic centres for development 
strategy and learning and South-South 
Cooperation. South-South thinktank activity 
is now also extensive. Despite the existential 
gulf in concepts, vocabulary, measurement 
and visions between North and South, 
the scope for mutual learning and practical 
interaction on the ground is increasing and 
pursued through a number of emerging 
global partnerships and coalitions.
The decision at the Ufa Summit to launch 
meetings of senior BRICS officials responsible 
for development cooperation could produce 
important new thinking about the role 
of BRICS countries in this area under the 
chairs of India and China in the coming two 
years. The articulation in the BRICS Strategy 
document agreed in Ufa in July 2015 of 
‘connectivity’ as a development vector owes 
much to China’s OBOR initiative. The Ufa 
Declaration proposes that the OBOR, the 
Shanghai Cooperation Forum and Eurasian 
Economic Union strategies should converge, 
creating a new development dynamic 
in a troubled region. India and Pakistan 
are now both members of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation. China is also 
actively promoting extensive geo-economic 
strategies with other regions – Africa, Latin 
America, the Middle East – linked to its own 
structural transformation, moving beyond 
traditional South-South modalities to inject 
major financial flows from its policy banks 
and investors. And India’s development 
partnerships and modalities are assuming a 
more strategic character. 
Current contexts and the future role 
of the BRICS
1. Economic: The commodity-dependent 
members – Brazil, South Africa and Russia 
– have lost economic momentum and face 
multiple challenges. China is navigating 
systemic economic and financial transitions 
at a ‘new normal’ moderate-to-high growth 
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Policy recommendations
The following sets out a number of recommendations for BRICS and G20 
policymakers as well as more developed country policymakers around the key 
contributions that the G20 and BRICS Summit could make to efforts to ensure 
more effective global governance, global development and cooperation.
• Demonstrate and recognise that a politically diverse multipolar global 
governance system is both functionally essential and culturally enriching and 
points towards a world of strategic cooperation and away from strategic 
competition.
• Advance the universal implementation of the 2015 UN agreements for 
sustainable development and climate change.
• Promote and recognise that development programmes for connectivity 
infrastructure must be taken to scale within and across regions in order to 
deliver the UN 2030 Agenda.
• Promote and recognise in this context that the emergence of effective, 
accountable states is a vital common interest and an area for cooperation, with 
strengthened support for peace-building and peacekeeping accompanied by 
regional economic initiatives. 
• Acknowledge that the new multilateral development financing institutions 
represent a valuable component of a larger, innovative and interactive 
development financing system, drawing in investment from the enterprise 
sector, and working through transparency and cooperation at both multilateral 
and bilateral levels. Cooperation between existing development financing 
institutions and new development institutions is vital. 
• Encourage and recognise the role of South-South Development Cooperation, with 
emerging countries as important providers of ideas and experience and increasing 
interaction with the development programmes of OECD-DAC countries.
rate, with global reverberations. In the 
BRICS Summit host country, India, the 
economic catch-up process is producing 
high and possibly even higher growth. 
2. Political: There are powerful 
expressions of pain across many G20 
and BRICS countries from groups 
who feel left behind or insecure 
in a globalised, technologically 
dynamic economic process. Migration 
dramas, financial system scandals and 
sophisticated tax avoidance practices, 
and rising inequality add to the sense 
of insecurity and injustice. Geopolitical 
contestation and conflicts and 
another era of military competition 
and nuclear weapon technology add 
to anxieties. 
3. Geopolitical: Where the G20/
BRICS processes can contribute most 
profoundly is to demonstrate that in 
a world where strategic cooperation 
and strategic competition both exist 
uneasily, the new global governance 
arrangements are clearly taking the 
world into the strategic cooperation 
mode and reducing the risks that 
accompany strategic competition.
